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The sustainability of US public debt has been widely discussed since the Great Recession. Using annual data since
1940, we estimate and compare different specifications of fiscal rules. Estimates of constant-parameter fiscal rules
show no evidence of sustainability. This may be due to the instability of government's behaviour over time. Thus,
we estimate a Markov-switching fiscal rule in order to identify periods of unsustainable and sustainable fiscal
policies. First, we show that the government stabilizes public debt only periodically. Second, during these periods,
the government's reaction is sufficiently tight to stabilize public debt over the entire horizon. We conclude that a
relatively short-lived but tight fiscal contraction can be sufficient to ensure long-run US debt sustainability.1. Introduction
Following the Global Financial Crisis and the Great Recession,
countercyclical fiscal policies led to substantial increases in public debt in
most OECD countries. It raised concerns about fiscal sustainability and a
debate arose between Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2017), Elmendorf
and Sheiner (2017), on the one hand, and Mehrotra (2017) on the other
hand on optimal future fiscal policy in this respect. While the former
argued that a fiscal stimulus would not deteriorate fiscal sustainability
despite high debt levels, the latter argued for a reduction of public debt
because of high debt levels. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2017) use
local projections on a panel of OECD countries to compute the reactions
of a set of macro variables to government spending shocks. Following
their econometric exercise, they show that fiscal shocks do not produce
adverse effects on measures of fiscal sustainability like interest rates, CDS
spreads, and the debt to GDP ratio. Mehrotra (2017) argues that under
the secular stagnation scenario where the real interest rate falls short of
the real GDP growth rate, higher levels of debt “allow the government to
raise real resources without resorting to taxation”. Meanwhile, he also
argues on a “moderate probability” that the real interest rate goes beyond
the real growth rate over a 5–10-year horizon. Consequently, he rec-
ommends austerity measures because he finds that the tax maximizing
level of public debt is lower than the actual average level since 1870. In
contrast with Mehrotra (2017), Elmendorf and Sheiner (2017) expectlogne, 75014 Paris, France.
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.low interest rates in the US over a long period and despite their first
sentence: “The federal budget is on an unsustainable path”, they argue for
larger public debt and public investment in the US in the short run, hence
for a postponement of deficit reduction measures.
The aim of this paper is to assess fiscal sustainability in the US under
two different regimes. The first one will show a positive response of the
government's primary surplus to growing debt, whereas the second
regime will show no response at all, or even a negative one. As the pre-
vious debate recalls, fiscal sustainability and fiscal policy are inter-
connected. If sustainability is at stake as Mehrotra (2017) reports, fiscal
contraction is the optimal policy. Otherwise, public debt will be unsus-
tainable. On the contrary, fiscal expansion can be the optimal policy
when higher growth is possible and sustainability is granted as Auerbach
and Gorodnichenko (2017) argue. The existence of sustainable and un-
sustainable fiscal regimes has been recently studied by Cassou et al.
(2017) who report frequent shifts from one regime to another that they
relate to the economic situation. Under weak economic conditions, fiscal
sustainability is not fulfilled whereas it is when economic conditions are
strong.
Our contribution to the existing literature is to link periodic fiscal
regimes, either sustainable or unsustainable, with a global (or long-run)
indicator of fiscal sustainability. Hence we do not only identify regime
switches but we also implement an empirical test of the global fiscal
sustainability in the US. As a matter of fact, the existence of periodicespo.fr (J. Creel).
arch 2018
Fig. 1. Surplus-debt correlations (United States, 1940–2016). Note: The left panel plots the simple correlation between primary surplus-to-GDP and lagged debt-to-
GDP. The center panel plots the correlation between the primary surplus adjusted for cyclical components (output gap and cyclical spending), using a simple linear
regression as explained in footnote 1. Finally, the right panel plots correlations of primary surplus (adjusted for cyclical components) depending on the two fiscal
regimes identified in this paper, using Markov-Switching techniques. Finally, for each panel, we display an OLS regression line.
Source: Office of Management and Budget, authors' calculations.
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global assessment of fiscal sustainability. Once a periodic unsustainable
regime is identified, the following question is usually raised: how long
can the necessary fiscal adjustment be delayed without threatening the
global sustainability of public debt? This is typically the question that
Elmendorf and Sheiner (2017) deal with. Despite short-run fiscal
unsustainability, the economic situation may make it possible to raise
public debt further and improve long-run debt sustainability, they argue.
In a sustainable fiscal regime, the important question pertaining to global
sustainability is: are the properties of the regime in terms of the reaction
of fiscal policy towards public debt and/or in terms of frequency suffi-
cient to ensure the long-run sustainability of public debt? Actually if the
government is reacting only weakly and/or very infrequently towards
debt variations, the debt-to-GDP ratio may not decline and a new crisis
may push debt into unsustainable territories in the long run.
This paper addresses the properties of global sustainability and gives
an answer to the previous questions. We apply to US annual data from
1940 to 2016 the Regime-Switching test developed in a companion
paper. Aldama and Creel (2017) extend Bohn (1998)’s fiscal policy
feedback rule to the regime-switching case and derive conditions under
which fiscal policy is globally sustainable while allowing for persistent
unsustainable regimes. These conditions are based on the properties of
fiscal rules under the two regimes.
We follow a two-step empirical strategy. First, we estimate constant-
parameter fiscal policy rules. We also control for non-linearities using a
quadratic and cubic specifications of Bohn's fiscal rule. These baseline
regressions do not give significant evidence of a sustainable fiscal regime,
i.e. a strictly and significant positive response of primary balance to
lagged public debt. Still, these results may be triggered by the funda-
mental instability in the relationship between primary surplus and lagged
public debt identified by Bohn (1998). Fig. 1 gives a snapshot of this
instability. It shows the surplus-debt correlations without and with
adjustment for cyclical components.1 When considering the first two
panels in Fig. 1, it appears that the cyclical adjustment suggested by Bohn
is not sufficient to exhibit a strong and significant positive correlation
between primary surplus and lagged debt. In the third panel, we split our1 We follow Bohn (1998) and we use an OLS regression of primary balance
against an intercept, output gap xt and cyclical government spending ~gt . Then,
we extract the estimated residuals bvt : bvt ¼ st  bα þcαx xt þcαg ~gt and interpret it
as the primary surplus-to-GDP, adjusted for the cyclical components of fiscal
policy.
472sample in two, using the two fiscal regimes identified in this paper and
show that one regime displays a strong positive surplus-debt correlation
while the other displays a non-significant one.
Hence, in a second-step, we estimate a two-state Markov-switching
fiscal policy rule in order to account for differentiated responses of pri-
mary surplus to public debt. We find significant evidence of a sustainable
regime that displays a positive and strongly significant feedback effect of
public debt. In contrast, the unsustainable regime is characterized by a
non-significant feedback effect. Drawing on the estimated Markov-
switching fiscal rule, we directly assess the global sustainability condi-
tions developed in Aldama and Creel (2017). Results indicate that US
fiscal policy has been globally sustainable, despite persistent unsustain-
able fiscal regimes.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature.
Section 3 presents the paper's methodological framework and describes
the dataset. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 draws
policy implications from the analysis. Section 6 concludes.
2. Related literature
A first approach to fiscal sustainability consists in testing for unit-
roots and stationarity or for cointegration relations between fiscal vari-
ables. This approach abstracts from an explicit modelling of fiscal policy
behaviour. Seminal contributions are Hamilton and Flavin (1986), Wil-
cox (1989), Trehan and Walsh (1988, 1991) and Quintos (1995). More
recently, Afonso and Jalles (2016) compute panel unit-root tests and
cointegration tests on revenues, spending, primary deficits and debts of a
group of OECD countries. They find that public debts are not sustainable.
Chen (2016) achieves an opposite conclusion on the US. He also studies
nonlinearities in the relationship between fiscal instruments which are
either related to the business cycles or to changes in the fiscal legisla-
tion.2 Chen (2016) concludes that the higher public spending the lower
the sustainability of US public finances.
Another way of dealing with fiscal sustainability hinges on the dy-
namic properties of fiscal shocks on real GDP and measures of fiscal
sustainability (debt-to-GDP ratio, short-term and long-term interest rates,
CDS spreads, real GDP and inflation). In this respect, Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko (2017) study the asymmetric and nonlinear effects of
fiscal policy shocks during expansions or recessions and in a low-debt2 Chen (2016) argues that a change in the debt ceiling may well change the
evolution of tax policy or that of public spending.
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spending shocks can have an important positive effect on growth in re-
cessions and can lead to a reduction in public debt-to-GDP ratio, hence
improving fiscal sustainability. Moreover, when controlling for the level
of public debt, they do not find significant evidence of strong penalties
for fiscal stimulus when the public debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds 100%.
Another strand of the literature builds on the explicit modelling
behaviour of governments (Bohn, 1998).3 After depicting a fiscal policy
feedback rule, Bohn (1998) argues that a positive response of the fiscal
instrument –usually the primary balance-to-GDP ratio or tax
receipts-to-GDP– to the lagged public debt-to-GDP ratio ensures fiscal
sustainability. Furthermore, if the response to lagged debt is larger than
the real interest rate,4 fiscal policy follows a debt-stabilizing rule, see
(Bohn 1998; Mendoza and Ostry, 2008; Daniel and Shiamptanis, 2013).
Bohn (1998) and Mendoza and Ostry (2008) both conclude that US
public debt is sustainable. Although he reports a lower response of fiscal
policy towards debt, Claeys (2006) concludes that US debt is sustainable.
Bohn (1998) also estimates nonlinear specifications of fiscal policy rules
which include quadratic and cubic terms of debt-to-GDP ratios. Results
indicate a significant and positive feedback effect of quadratic debt on
primary surplus, but a non-significant negative cubic term, showing an
“increasing marginal response of surpluses to changes in debt”. In an
attempt to shed light on these nonlinearities, Ghosh et al. (2013a, b)
introduce the concept of “fiscal fatigue” in policy behaviour. They argue
that the reaction of the primary surplus may be “flatter” at high levels of
public debt. Using the fiscal fatigue property of cubic fiscal policy rules,
they propose a method to compute maximum debt limits depending on
policy behaviour and risk-neutral lenders. After having estimated a cubic
fiscal policy rule on a panel of OECD countries, they estimate
country-specific debt limits under two scenarios –historical vs projected–
for the growth-adjusted real interest rate. Their results suggest that most
of OECD countries still have large fiscal spaces. In a similar vein, Fournier
and Fall (2017) show that the US still have a large fiscal space. However,
the fiscal space becomes undetermined after a change in the specification
of the fiscal rule (with less fiscal tightening at a high debt level).
Alternatively to quadratic or cubic fiscal policy rules, the literature
also turned towards time-varying and regime-switching specifications
because of multiple evidence of structural breaks and regime shifts in
standard constant-parameter specifications. Drawing on a time-varying
parameter (TVP) model of US fiscal policy rule, Nguyen et al. (2017)
show that fiscal sustainability was achieved until 2005 but not after that.
The application of Markov-switching fiscal policy rules to the US dates
back the mid-2000s. Favero and Monacelli (2005) investigate the insta-
bility of monetary and fiscal policy rules using Markov-switching dy-
namic regressions. They notably challenge the common wisdom (at the
time) of a continuously passive or Ricardian fiscal policy in the US after
WWII. They note, in addition, that regime-switching fiscal rules are
better fitting policy behaviour than constant-parameter specifications.
Contributing to the so-called Fiscal Theory of Price-Level, (Chung et al.
2007; Davig and Leeper, 2007, 2011; Bianchi, 2012) also estimate
monetary and fiscal Markov-switching policy rules and provide evidence
of unsustainable (or passive) fiscal regimes in the US. Cassou et al.,
(2017) introduce asymmetric reactions of the fiscal instrument to lagged
debt and output gap that depend on good or bad economic conditions.
They also report MS-VAR estimations. They notably show that sustain-
able regimes occur during good economic conditions whereas unsus-
tainable regimes occur during bad economic conditions.3 Bohn (2007) develops strong criticisms towards the econometric analyses of
the first approach. His main argument is that high-order integration, dismissed
by this approach, is conducive to sustainability because it is consistent with the
intertemporal government budget constraint. He labels this situation as “weakly
sustainable”.
4 Generally adjusted for the real GDP growth rate after using GDP-scaled fiscal
variables.
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to OECD countries. Here we mention only a few studies. For example,
Burger and Marinkov (2012) and Afonso and Toffano (2013) apply
regime-switching fiscal policy rules respectively to OECD and EU coun-
tries and find periodic unsustainable regimes. Ko and Morita (2015)
apply a Markov-switching trivariate SVAR model to Japanese public
debt.5 They find evidence of two fiscal regimes between 1970 and 2011
and a single regime switch at the beginning of the 1990s. Hence, the first
regime displaying a sustainable situation ended early in the 1990s
whereas the second unsustainable fiscal regime has been in place ever
since. According to their simulations, fiscal sustainability in Japan could
be achieved either through a higher nominal growth or via a shift to-
wards the Ricardian regime. Ricci-Risquete et al. (2016) apply
Markov-switching fiscal policy rules to Spain and the Euro area. They
find evidence of regime switches in fiscal policy, both in Spain and at the
Euro area level. Their results indicate that the Spanish fiscal policy has
committed to its fiscal sustainability requirements, irrespective of fiscal
regimes, while the Euro area fiscal stance has been more countercyclical
and sometimes unsustainable.
3. Methodology and dataset
Empirical studies on time-varying and regime-switching fiscal policy
rules generally and successfully identify sub-periods during which the
government does not stabilize public debt and sometimes even displays a
negative feedback effect to lagged public debt. However, these studies do
not conclude on whether the time-varying or regime-switching feature of
fiscal policy threatens (or not) the long-run sustainability of public debt.
In the empirical part of the paper, we will thus hinge on the test by
Aldama and Creel (2017) to assess long-run fiscal sustainability.3.1. Methodological framework
The data of Fig. 2 straightforwardly show a sharp increase in US
public debt-to-GDP ratio since 2009 and the persistence of primary def-
icits eight years after the Great Recession. At first glance, US historical
data suggest two distinct fiscal regimes which nicely fit a Markov-
switching representation (and better fit than a TVP approach with
continuous-time change). Indeed, we observe several episodes charac-
terized by an increasing public debt-to-GDP ratio without a clear
improvement of the primary surplus, which signal unsustainable fiscal
regimes, and episodes of increasing primary surplus following public
debt build-ups. For instance, in the early 1980s, primary deficits and
debts respectively increased in proportion to GDP whereas they fell quite
substantially in the early 1990s.
In light of these peaks and troughs in public debt evolution, our point
of departure is that a locally or periodically unsustainable fiscal policy
may not necessarily threaten the global or long-run sustainability of
public debt. In particular, under sufficient conditions on regime-specific
response of primary surplus to lagged public debt and on expected du-
rations of regimes, (i) the No-Ponzi Game (NPG) condition or (ii) the
Debt-Stabilizing condition may hold on the entire period despite peri-
odically unsustainable policies.
NPG condition holds when
γS >
γNS
dNSdS (1)
with γS and γNS the respective responses of the primary surplus to public5 This SVAR approach was initiated by Canzoneri et al. (2001) on US data
without regime-switching parameters. Creel and Le Bihan (2006) extended
Canzoneri et al. (2001)’s methodology with the introduction of
cyclically-adjusted primary balance data and applied it to a panel of advanced
OECD countries.
Fig. 2. Federal debt and primary federal surplus in the US (1940–2016).
Source: Office of Management and Budget.
6 Data are available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/
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and dS and dNS the respective average duration of the sustainable and
unsustainable regimes.
The NPG condition requires that the initial public debt-to-GDP ratio is
backed by the sum of future expected and discounted real primary
surpluses-to-GDP. The NPG condition per se does not impose any statio-
narity restriction, see Bohn (2007). Then an ever-increasing public
debt-to-GDP ratio will eventually reach the fiscal limit on the level of
primary surplus governments can run (Daniel, 2014; Daniel and
Shiamptanis, 2013). As a consequence, a stronger sustainability
constraint requires a stable public debt-to-GDP ratio around a long-run
value with a sufficient safety margin with respect to the fiscal limit.
The Debt-Stability condition therefore holds when
γS > jγNSj
dNS
dS
þ r  y
1þ y
dS þ dNS
dS
(2)
where r and y are the long-run average real interest rate and the growth
rate of real GDP.
The Debt-Stabilizing condition may not be stricter than the NPG
condition. First, the Debt-Stabilizing condition will be looser than the
NPG condition if the real interest rate on public debt is lower than the
growth rate of real GDP –which does not imply that the economy is
dynamically inefficient. Abel et al. (1989) have shown that, in a sto-
chastic economy with risk-free and risky assets, the correct theoretical
condition for dynamic efficiency is that the risky interest rate, not the safe
rate, must be larger than the growth rate of output. Empirically, Abel
et al. (1989) address the difficulty of measuring the actual rate of return
on risky capital by suggesting to test whether investment is lower (resp.
higher) than capital income at the aggregate level, hence concluding in
favour of dynamic efficiency (resp. dynamic inefficiency). They find that
7 advanced OECD economies including the US were dynamically effi-
cient at the end of the 1980s. Geerolf (2013) recently updated their
empirical work and overturned their results. He finds that OECD
advanced economies have over-accumulated capital. Second, if the
economy is actually dynamically efficient, the correct sustainability
condition is the NPG condition and not the Debt-Stabilizing condition.
Otherwise the government could simultaneously stabilize its debt and
run a Ponzi Scheme against its creditors which would be a source of474sub-optimality for rational creditors.
3.2. Dataset
We use historical data from the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) on federal debt, expenditures, receipts, primary budget, nominal
and real GDP, and GDP implicit deflator. The dataset covers years ranging
from 1940 to 2016.6
Following most studies on US fiscal policy, we use the federal debt
held by the public as a measure of consolidated gross public debt rather
than total gross federal debt; this choice is motivated by the fact that total
gross federal debt includes intragovernmental obligations to social se-
curity and other trusts funds, see Bohn (2008). We measure the nominal
interest rate on public debt by the ratio of net interest payments on public
debt held by the public, as in Bohn (1998, 2008); this measure is
generally called the apparent or effective interest rate on public debt.
Finally, the real interest rate will be calculated as the ex post real rate
deflated by the GDP implicit deflator. The choice of annual data is
dictated by the nature of fiscal policy: it is set at an annual frequency,
although revisions within the year are possible (Claeys, 2006). It is also
dictated by the availability of data on the OMB database. The long-run
nature of sustainability requires a long sample. Quarterly data for all
the variables in the model start being available at least 15 years after
1940.
We follow the literature on Model-Based Sustainability analysis
(Bohn, 1998; Mendoza and Ostry, 2008) and use the output gap and a
measure of cyclical real public spending as regressors in the fiscal policy
rule. Congressional Budget Office's estimates of potential real GDP are
not available for years prior to 1949. As a result, we use a standard HP
filtered output gap measure taking the cyclical component of log real
GDP over the entire sample. Similarly, cyclical real public spending is
defined as the cyclical component of log real public spending. In the HP
filter, we choose a smoothing parameter λ ¼ 100. Fig. 3 describes the
series of output gap and cyclical real public spending.Historicals.
Fig. 3. HP filtered output gap and cyclical real public spending (1940–2016).
Source: Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
Table 1
Standard model-based sustainability tests (1942–2016).
Dependent variable:
st
(1) Linear (2)
Quadratic
(3) Cubic (4) Kinked
Constant 0.0077 0.0119 0.0327 0.0075
(0.0181) (0.0316) (0.0640) (0.0093)
Lagged debt bt1 0.0049 0.0720 0.1782
(0.0377) (0.1047) (0.3405)
Quadratic lagged
debt b2t1
0.0650 0.3470
(0.0770) (0.5552)
Cubic lagged debt
b3t1
0.2015
(0.2735)
max (bt1– b ; 0) 0.0372
(0.0484)
Output gap xt 0.3372*** 0.3435*** 0.3480*** 0.3240***
(0.0812) (0.0816) (0.0823) (0.0801)
Cyclical government
spending gt
0.2394
***
0.2353*** 0.2377*** 0.2315***
(0.0187) (0.0183) (0.0190) (0.0185)
Adjusted R2 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
Nb. of obs 75 75 75 75
DW stat 2.2202 2.2895 2.2664 2.2639
Notes: standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Reported estimates are sig-
nificant at 1% level (***), 5% level (**) or 10% level (*). All models control for
first-order serially correlated residuals using a Cochrane-Orcutt procedure.
Source: authors' calculations.
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We follow a two-step empirical strategy. First, we estimate constant-
parameter fiscal policy rules and perform standard Model-Based Sus-
tainability tests. Strikingly, the constant-parameter estimates do not
allow to conclude in favour of the sustainability of US public debt. Sec-
ond, we estimate a two-state Markov-switching fiscal policy rule and
assess the global sustainability of US public debt.
4.1. Standard Model-Based Sustainability tests
We estimate the following fiscal policy rule
st ¼ αþ γbt1 þ αxxt þ αg~gt þ ut (3)
where st is the primary surplus-to-GDP ratio, bt1 is the end-of-period
public debt-to-GDP ratio, xt is the output gap and ~gt is cyclical real
public spending. Estimates of linear fiscal policy rules generally display a
strong auto-correlation in the residuals hence we estimate a model with
first-order autoregressive residuals ut ¼ ð1 ρLÞ1εt with εt i.i.d. N ð0;
σ2Þ. Thus, we estimate equation (3) with non-linear least squares (NLS)
and using a Cochrane-Orcutt procedure.
In addition, we also estimate non-linear specifications (4), (5) and (6)
of the fiscal policy rule, including quadratic and cubic terms and also a
kinked specification where the primary surplus only reacts to positive
deviations of lagged public debt from its mean b:
st ¼ αþ γ1bt1 þ γ2b2t1 þ αxxt þ αg~gt þ ut (4)
st ¼ αþ γ1bt1 þ γ2b2t1 þ γ3b3t1 þ αxxt þ αg~gt þ ut (5)
st ¼ αþ γkmax

bt1  b; 0
þ αxxt þ αg~gt þ ut (6)
We therefore account for a variety of non-linearities in the relation-
ship between primary surplus and public debt. Polynomial specifications
that include quadratic or cubic terms are meant to allow either for an
increasing or a decreasing reaction of primary surplus when the level of
public debt increases. In the quadratic specification (4), a positive coef-
ficient associated to squared debt-to-GDP ratio would indicate that the
response of the primary surplus increases with the level of public debt
whereas a negative coefficient would testify for “fiscal fatigue”. In the475cubic specification (5), “fiscal fatigue” would result in a negative coef-
ficient associated to cubic lagged debt-to-GDP ratio. Finally, the kinked
specification is motivated by the non-linear specification estimated by
Bohn (1998, Table 3) and assumes that fiscal policy increases the primary
surplus to meet its intertemporal budget constraint only when the public
debt-to-GDP ratio is above its long-run average b.
Column (1) in Table 1 shows the results for the baseline specification
(3). First, we do not find significant evidence of a strictly positive feed-
back effect of public debt on primary surplus. Hence, standard MBS
analysis would conclude in favour of the unsustainability of US fiscal
policy all over the period: large build-ups of public debt do not seem
positively correlated with a significant increase of primary surplus be-
tween 1940 and 2016. In comparison with former evidence of a sus-
tainable regime (Bohn, 1998, 2008), these results can probably be
interpreted as evidence of instability in the coefficient estimates of linear
Table 2
Estimated baseline Markov-switching fiscal rule (1942–2016).
Dependent variable: st Regime 1 Regime 2 Long-run
estimates
Constant 0.0189 0.0245* 0.0207*
(0.0122) (0.0127) (0.0113)
Lagged debt bt1 0.0221 0.0865*** 0.0423**
(0.0219) (0.0242) (0.0205)
Output gap xt 0.2871*** 0.8671*** 0.4690***
(0.0545) (0.1158) (0.0528)
Cyclical government
spending gt
0.1758*** 0.4137*** 0.2504***
(0.0130) (0.0239) (0.0105)
Regime properties Transition prob.
pii
Ergodic prob.
πi
Expected
duration di
i ¼ 1 0.92 0.69 12.47
i ¼ 2 0.82 0.31 5.70
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.76 Log
Likelihood
241.5045
Notes: standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Reported estimates are sig-
nificant at 1% level (***), 5% level (**) or 10% level (*). The model controls for
regime-invariant first-order serially correlated residuals.
Source: authors' calculations.
Table 3
Average growth-adjusted real interest rate.
1941–1952 1953–1981 1982–2016 Full sample
(1941–2016)
Estimated mean
μ
0.0806 0.0315 0.0036 0.0231
Robust
standard-
error
(0.0121) (0.0078) (0.0071) (0.0079)
Notes: sub-sample averages are determined using a Bai-Perron breakpoints
regression; full-sample (1941–2016) average is obtained from a simple OLS
regression. HAC robust standard-errors are reported in parenthesis.
Source: authors' calculations.
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Regarding non-linear specifications (4)–(6), results are shown in
columns (2)–(4). Overall, we find no evidence in favour of fiscal sus-
tainability. In the quadratic specification, the coefficient γ2 term is pos-
itive but not statistically different from zero. The cubic specification
displays a negative quadratic term γ2 and a positive cubic term γ3, but
both are non-significant. While being not significant, point estimates of
quadratic and cubic specifications do not provide any evidence of “fiscal
fatigue” in US fiscal policy. Finally, the estimated kinked fiscal rule does
not show a significant positive reaction to deviations of lagged public
debt from its long-run average.
4.2. Regime-switching Model-Based Sustainability tests
Constant-parameter estimates of fiscal policy rules, be they linear or
non-linear, do not give significant evidence in favour of a sustainable
fiscal regime in the US between 1940 and 2016. Cassou et al. (2017) find
similar shortcomings with a linear specification on an updated and longer
sample than Bohn (2008). In this section, we argue that our former re-
sults may be driven by the instability, i.e. regime-switching properties, of
fiscal policy rules' estimates.
We estimate the following Markov-switching fiscal rule in equation7 There are at least two reasons for the differences between the first set of
results and former results in Bohn (1998, 2008). First, the sample are not
similar. Bohn (1998) uses data between 1916 and 1995 and Bohn (2008) be-
tween 1791 and 2012 (or 2003). Cassou et al. (2017) also show that the
extension of Bohn (1998)’s sample gives different results. Second, Bohn uses
military spending as a proxy for cyclical government spending.
476(7) by direct maximization of the log likelihood, following Hamilton
(1989):
st ¼ αðztÞ þ γðztÞbt1 þ αðztÞxxt þ αðztÞg~gt þ ut (7)
where zt is an unobserved two-state Markov process with constant
transition probabilities. We estimate our model with first-order auto-
correlated residuals ut ¼ ð1 ρLÞ1σεt where εt is i.i.d. N ð0;1Þ and
regime-invariant standard error σ of residuals. We use 10 000 random
draws of initial values for the ML algorithm in order to avoid a local
maximum and reduce the dependence of final results on initial values.
We also define the long-run estimate α of regime-switching parameters
using ergodic probabilities ðπ1;π2Þ
α  α1π1 þ α2π2 (8)
as well as its estimated standard-deviation
σα 
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
ðσα1π1Þ2 þ ðσα2π2Þ2 þ 2ℂovðα1; α2Þ
q
(9)
We report estimation results in table Table 2 and smoothed and
filtered probabilities in Fig. 4.
First, the estimated Markov-switching fiscal policy rule identifies two
regimes. There is a strongly significant positive response of primary
surplus to lagged public debt in regime 2 which we label sustainable,
whereas the response of primary surplus to lagged public debt is non-
significant but positive in regime 1, which we label unsustainable. Sec-
ond, the sustainable regime appears less persistent than the unsustain-
able one, a feature which can also be found in Cassou et al. (2017).
Estimated probabilities of the fiscal regimes suggest that US fiscal policies
have periodically been non-Ricardian since 1940 and over relatively long
periods of time, particularly between the mid-1950s and mid-1960s or
between the early 1970s and the early 1990s. Actually, the sustainable
regime has an expected duration of 5.7 years compared with 12.5 years
for the unsustainable regime. Evidence of recurring and persistent regime
switches may explain ex post why constant-parameter estimates of fiscal
policy rules (in section 4.1) cannot identify a significant positive reaction
of the primary surplus to lagged public debt. Third, the occurrence of
sustainable regimes between 1940 and 1945, 1952 and 1955 and be-
tween 1966 and 1971 matches WWII, the Korean War, and the Johnson
Administration. These periods have been found sustainable in other
contributions (Nguyen et al., 2017; Afonso and Jalles, 2014). Quite
interestingly, they are consistent with institutional changes in US federal
budget legislation like the adoption in 1946 (but prepared before) of the
Legislative Reorganization Act, the Omnibus Appropriations Act for fiscal
year 1951, or the implementation of the Report of the President's Com-
mission on Budget Concepts since 1967 (Nguyen et al., 2017). Despite
high spending, fiscal policy was also oriented towards the limitation of
public debt increases. Finally, the long-run estimate of the feedback effect
of public debt on the primary surplus is significantly positive and
consistent with former results by Bohn (1998, 2008).
Given γNS is not statistically different from zero, the NPG condition
depends exclusively on the sign of γS. The Debt-Stabilizing condition
includes the average growth-adjusted real interest rate rga ¼ ðr  yÞ=
ð1þ yÞ and implies to choose an adequate measure for it. We estimate the
average growth-adjusted real interest rate using a Bai-Perron regression:
rgat ¼ μþ εt (10)
allowing for structural breaks in the mean μ. Results suggest different
significant average growth-adjusted real rates by sub-periods in the US,
see Fig. 5 and Table 3. Hence, we present full-sample and sub-sample
tests for the Debt-Stabilizing condition, using estimated average
growth-adjusted real rates. Finally, we test NPG and Debt-Stabilizing
conditions using one-sided Student tests (Table 4).
All tests conclude that the estimated Markov-switching fiscal policy
rule meets both NPG and Debt-Stabilizing conditions. Regarding the
Fig. 4. Baseline model, estimated probabilities of sustainable regime.
Source: authors' calculations.
Fig. 5. Growth-adjusted real interest rate (1941–2016).
Source: Office of Management and Budget (OMB), authors' calculations.
Table 4
Regime–switching MBS tests results.
NPG
condition
Debt-Stabilizing condition
Full-
sample
Full
sample
1941–1952 1953–1981 1982–2016
t-stat 3.5768 4.5327 6.9120 4.8798 3.4293
Unilateral
p-value
0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005
Notes: these student tests assume that γNS is virtually equal to zero from estimates
obtained in Table 2.
Source: authors'calculations.
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477latter condition, this is true whatever the period considered to estimate
the long-run growth-adjusted real rate. In particular, our results suggest
that US fiscal policy has not used the fiscal rooms for maneuver stemming
from negative growth-adjusted real rates to run a Ponzi Scheme. Finally,
despite recurring and persistent unsustainable (or non-Ricardian) re-
gimes, we find evidence of a globally sustainable fiscal policy in the US:
sustainable regimes are sufficiently tight and sufficiently frequent to ensure
that public debt will be backed by future expected present-value primary
surpluses.
5. Policy implications
This research yields specific implications for fiscal policy. First, fiscal
P. Aldama, J. Creel Economic Modelling 81 (2019) 471–479sustainability requirements could likely be less demanding than
commonly believed. Our regime-switching approach revives the argu-
ment by Canzoneri et al. (2001) that a (globally) Ricardian fiscal policy
could be more plausible. The “worries” expressed by Fed Chairwoman J.
Yellen about the “sustainability of the US debt trajectory” (reported in
Financial Times, 29 November 2017) highlight the short run-long run
nexus about fiscal sustainability. In the short run, US fiscal policy may
well deteriorate fiscal sustainability but maybe not sufficiently to
generate unsustainability in the long run.
A usual criticism against Canzoneri et al. (2001) points to the fact that
they do not study bounded equilibria for public debt-to-GDP ratio, but
only focus on the NPG condition. Hence, if the real interest rate on public
debt is larger than the growth rate of real GDP, satisfying the NPG con-
dition would not be a sufficient condition for achieving fiscal sustain-
ability because the public debt-to-GDP ratio would eventually reach its
maximum level, implied by the fiscal limit on primary surplus (Bi, 2012;
Daniel and Shiamptanis, 2013 among others).
The analysis developed in Aldama and Creel (2017) and used in this
paper extends Canzoneri et al. (2001)’s approach to a debt-stabilizing
condition and answers this criticism by proposing a condition ensuring
the long-run stability of public debt-to-GDP ratio. But what is probably
more important is the fact that the apparent real interest rate has been on
average lower than the growth rate of real GDP over the period
1941–2016, see Table 3 and Fig. 5. This empirical fact implies that the
NPG condition is actually sufficient to ensure a stable public debt-to-GDP
ratio in the long run. As a result, an infrequent sustainable fiscal regime
can ensure the long-run stability of public debt-to-GDP ratio despite long
periods of gradually increasing debt due to the relatively high persistence
of the unsustainable fiscal regime.
Yet, we implicitly assume that private creditors expect fiscal policy
will turn back to a sustainable path with a certain probability in the
future: stated differently, we assume that the government commits to a
stable long-run probability distribution of regimes, i.e. the ergodic
probabilities.
6. Conclusions
This paper investigates the global (or long-run) sustainability of US
public debt. The ups and downs of public debt raise two concerns: first,
how long is it possible to postpone fiscal consolidation before public debt
becomes unsustainable? And when fiscal consolidation occurs, is it tight
enough to ensure long-run fiscal sustainability? We draw on Aldama and
Creel (2017) and test the sufficient conditions on regime-switching fiscal
policy feedback rules that permit to achieve a No-Ponzi Game and a
Debt-Stabilizing condition. When these conditions are met, global sus-
tainability is ensured despite persistent unsustainable fiscal regimes.
The main outcome of the paper is that fiscal policy in the US has been
globally sustainable since 1940. On average, a 12-year period of fiscal
consolidation's postponement does not preclude global fiscal sustain-
ability, provided periods of fiscal consolidation last almost 6 years on
average and embed a sharp reaction of primary balance towards lagged
public debt (the semi-elasticity is equal to 8.7%). Introducing the possi-
bility of an instability in the relationship between primary balance and
public debt via fiscal regimes enables to highlight periods of sustain-
ability and unsustainability and gives contrasting results vis-a-vis those
obtained with a linear (or non-linear) fiscal feedback rule without regime
switches.
Future research on US fiscal sustainability may go in two mutually
non-exclusive directions. First, the use of quarterly data may reinforce
the tests' statistical properties. The limitation with the use of quarterly
data relates to public debt. Usually, they are only genuinely annual in
that they reflect the annual flows of deficits and annual revaluations. In
the US case, it should be possible however to use genuine public debt
quarterly data, i.e. data which have not been transformed into quarterly
data a posteriori. The sample would be shortened though, true quarterly
data being available 15 years later than annual data. Second, the478estimations of global sustainability abstract from the monetary regime
and a richer set of macroeconomic variables. Introducingmacroeconomic
feedbacks, like inflation dynamics and a monetary policy rule, could be
done in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model as advised
recently by Leeper and Li (2017). It would permit to highlight the
possible endogeneity of fiscal policy to the macroeconomic context and
to embed the test of global sustainability into a comprehensive
framework.
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